Theory and Practice of Russian Nationalism

The claim of superiority of ethnic Russians over newcomers and, more generally, non-Russians, manifests itself today in new, very aggressive forms of association, under the generic title of Russkaja Obščina (Russian Community). Weakening the very authority of the state, they border on uncontrollable extremism as in the days of the anti-Semitic pogroms, today directed mainly against Muslims.

Moscow (AsiaNews) - In addition to the official ideology of the ‘Russian world’, turned against globalism in the name of ‘multipolarity’, an internal nationalism is growing in Russia, more typical of many societies thrown into crisis by migratory flows, with the claim of superiority of ethnic Russians over newcomers and more generally over non-Russians, a recurring phenomenon in a country that has always sought to merge different nationalities.

This now manifests itself in new, very aggressive forms of association, under the generic title of Russkaja Obščina, ‘Russian Community’. Ethnologist Kharun Sidorov tried to elaborate on the reasons for this phenomenon in Idel.Realii, pointing out that ‘nationalist drives are cyclical in the history of Russia.

The feelings of Russians are very much conditioned by the positions of the ruling power, more so than in other countries, precisely because of the traditional colonial policy that seeks to encompass the many ethnic groups.

Another expert, Miroslav Grokh, distinguishes two types of nations, which generate different inspirations: the ‘state’ ones and those corresponding to non-state national movements.

The anti-Russian nationalisms tending towards ‘de-colonisation’ are overpowered by the ‘state nationalism’ of the Russians, and in this context it is clear that Russian nationalism recognises itself in the leader in power, as today in Vladimir Putin, and is not an opposition movement, although it is difficult to control even from the Kremlin.

As Kharun reminds us, there have been Russian nationalist movements of radical opposition to tsarism in the past, especially at the beginning of the 20th century, which appealed to European-style ‘civil nationalism’, from Herzen to Bakunin to the so-called narodniki (the ‘populars’), as well as nationalist-liberals such as Petr Struve, also in opposition to the Soviet revolution.

The most authentic face of Russian nationalism, however, has always been the so-called černosotentsy, the ‘red-browns’, also evoked in the ‘fascio-communist’ inspiration of the 1990s.

The latter have also often been inspired by religious symbolism, such as the ‘Union of Michael the Archangel’, the ‘Holy Vigilance’ and others, with an aggressive spirit towards Jews, Freemasons, minor and hostile peoples such as the Poles known as ljakhy, or even the Ukrainians known as khokhly, always in veneration of the ‘tsar-father’ of the fatherland.

Even today, the variants of the ‘Russian Community’ claim to represent the state, using various forms of pressure and violence against foreigners, and in this they actually make state authority itself more fragile, trespassing into uncontrollable extremism as in the days of the anti-Semitic pogroms in tsarist Russia, today mainly directed against Muslims.

The parliamentary and legislative initiatives for the exaltation of the ‘constituent people of the state’, an expression that also applies to the Orthodox Church, in fact reintroduce a division between first and second degree citizens, in increasingly acute and divisive forms, as Kharun observes.

This risks losing the hard-earned support of the Russian-speaking ethnic communities among the many scattered across the lands of the Federation, and religions other than Orthodox Christianity, effectively reviving the anti-Russian nationalism of even very small groups in many regions.

The černosotentsy paradoxically weaken the expressions of the Russkij mir, returning to denigrate minor peoples and migrants as basurmany, another ancient expression to define hostile foreigners on Russian territory, a mixture of ‘Asians’ and ‘Muslims’. According to experts, this contradiction between ‘governmental and non-governmental’ nationalism never lasts too long in the history of Russia, but usually ends with upheavals that destroy the state or its opponents, to start the cycle of an always unfinished amalgam again.

Russian imperialism once again shows its fragility, Kharun concludes, and paradoxically one of the greatest dangers for the Putin regime would end up being the disruption of its own ideology that provokes these regurgitations of extreme nationalism: the Russian world destroys the Russian world, in its most extreme variants.