新型冠状病毒：中国政权向警察灌输思想以避免社会动荡
共产党领导人担心发生在湖北省和江西省边界的类似事件重演。在对抗疫情大流行时，执法机构必须忠于政权。内蒙古、河南和四川的病例。 「社会稳定」是中共的根本关切。
香港（亚洲新闻）- 当新型冠状病毒大流行的中心湖北省居民，与邻近江西省居民发生冲突时，来自两省的警察加入了对峙。中国领导人担心这些事件可能再次发生，威胁到他们主要关注的国家的社会稳定。为了避免新的动乱，北京发起了一场针对警察的政治灌输运动，被视为抵御与大流行危机有关的可能骚乱的前线。 《China Brief》的记者兼总编辑约翰·多森（John Dotson）进行了分析。由詹姆斯敦基金会提供，原文是英語。
Introduction: A Riot on the Border of Epidemic-Wracked Hubei Province
The central Chinese city of Wuhan, in Hubei Province, was the original epicenter from which the COVID-19 viral outbreak first emerged in November-December 2019. Hubei Province was placed under a strict lockdown in mid-January that lasted for over two months (China Brief, January 29). On March 25, authorities in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) announced the lifting of most travel restrictions for residents of Hubei Province, with the exception of Wuhan City itself (Xinhua, March 25). (Restrictions for residents of Wuhan were later eased on April 8). However, the lifting of these restrictions has not proceeded entirely smoothly. On March 27, a major social disturbance occurred on the bridge over the Yangzi River that connects the town of Xiaochi in far eastern Hubei with the town of Jiujiang in northern Jiangxi Province. On that Friday, Hubei residents attempted to cross the bridge, but were blocked by police from the Jiangxi side. A tense stand-off escalated into a riot that reportedly involved not only citizens and police, but also clashes between police from the two bordering provinces (Radio Free Asia, March 27).
Regional tensions were revealed in video of the incident, in which angry citizens could clearly be heard to chant “Let’s go, Hubei” when marching to confront barricades set up by Jiangxi police (HK Free Press, March 27). The police barricades were presumably ordered by Jiangxi officials—acting in apparent contravention of official national policy—who were fearful that an influx of people from Hubei could once more spread COVID-19 infections. This likely revealed skepticism on the part of regional officials towards the central government’s message that the epidemic has been contained in Hubei. It also revealed issues of fear and discrimination against Hubei persons on the part of Chinese from other provinces, a problem acknowledged in official PRC press outlets (China Daily, March 30).
The March 27 incident provided a dramatic example of the sort of social unrest that Chinese Communist Party (CCP) officials have clearly feared could materialize in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, which has resulted in tens of thousands of deaths inside China and across the globe. [1] Hubei citizens have been subject to harsh conditions under government quarantines, resulting in a steady build-up of popular anger (China Brief, April 1). This incident may not be the last of its type to emerge as a result of the pandemic, and the CCP has taken active steps over the past two months to reinforce political indoctrination for local police agencies—thereby attempting to ensure that police officers will remain loyal to the ruling party in the event of any major incidents that might threaten “social order and stability” in the country.
Intensified Propaganda and Political Loyalty Indoctrination Directed at Chinese Police
Since at least early February, PRC local government and state media outlets have emphasized consistent themes that, amid the ongoing pandemic crisis, Chinese police must “maintain a high-level sense of political responsibility” 一thinly coded language for loyalty to the ruling CCP. Police have been further advised to “keep a steadfast political position [and] maintain a high level of uniformity with the Party center”. These exhortations also frequently involve the message “Don’t Forget [Our] Original Purpose, Keep Firmly in Mind the Historical Mission”, a slogan closely associated with CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping since it was unveiled last year (China Brief, July 31, 2019).
Specific illustrations of this trend, drawn from media coverage of the Public Security Bureaus in three different regions of the country, are provided in the examples below. The themes (and often, specific use of phrasing) are broadly consistent among these examples, suggesting higher-level direction for a propaganda campaign intended to reinforce police loyalty to the CCP. These examples also extend to regions far beyond the pandemic’s epicenter in Hubei, indicating that CCP authorities are concerned for bolstering the political indoctrination of police agencies nationwide.
Xinghe County, Inner Mongolia
Reporting on the Public Security Bureau in Xinghe County (Inner Mongolia) indicates that “in epidemic prevention work the first matter is the political mission, keeping to one’s post, combating the epidemic, preventing dangers [and] ensuring public security and promoting stability.” Both the regular People’s Police and the Auxiliary Police were praised for “maintaining a high sense of political responsibility [and] sense of the historical mission.” Per this account, the Xinghe police were so dedicated in their loyalty to the CCP that, alongside their other responsibilities, they “especially talked politics” while manning security checkpoints established for the purpose of epidemic control (Peng Pai News, February 2).
Zhumadian City, Henan Province
A press account from Henan Province provides a heroic account of Guo Yuanzhe, a political instructor with the Public Security Bureau in Zhumadian City, Henan Province. Guo is praised as a model police official and Party member, who is both tireless in his work on behalf of the public, and absolutely loyal to the central CCP leadership. Per this account, once the epidemic broke out, Guo “energetically answered the call to raise high the Party’s flag on the front line of the epidemic prevention battle.” To this end, Guo helped to organize “Party member shock troop teams” to disinfect suspected contaminated areas. Guo also worked to inspire fellow CCP members among the police by organizing lectures to emphasize that his colleagues “must resolutely bring into play the party organization fortress combat functions, and set forth party members as a model vanguard” amid counter-epidemic operations (Henan Xinyu Wang, March 30).
Qingyang District, Chengdu City, Sichuan Province
Another account is provided by the civil government of Qingyang District in the city of Chengdu. In addition to the standard calls for police to display a “high-level sense of political responsibility” and to “strengthen political consciousness”, police are advised that “Party leadership must run through epidemic control work from beginning to end”. Both the practical and ideological work of the police should be merged, in order to “combine together the deployment of political thought work with prevention and control duties.”
Per this reference, police should also view the epidemic crisis as an opportunity to strengthen both Party organizations and “wartime political thought work”. The police should “build the combat fortress of party organizations on the front line of epidemic control work,” while party cadres should serve as examples to the public. The epidemic also provides an opportunity to build the CCP’s image: “propaganda follows in the footsteps of the police, [and] propaganda follows the circumstances of the battlefield” (Qingyang District Government, February 19).
Conclusion
Even in the most settled of circumstances, “social stability” is a cornerstone concern for the CCP. Aside from its human toll, the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic has disrupted normal life across vast regions of China, severely damaged the economy, and created a crisis of governance for the CCP central leadership centered around Xi Jinping. As the CCP’s first line of defense against social unrest (with the heavier paramilitary People’s Armed Police in reserve behind them), local police agencies are naturally a focus of attention for the CCP authorities at a time when the prospects for social unrest are greater than ever. As both Chinese citizens and CCP officials seek to cope with the fallout of the pandemic, the Party is likely to grow ever-more insistent in its calls for police to maintain the proper “political position.”
