Russian cynicism towards the Jasmine Revolution
Moscow (AsiaNews/Agencies) – In Russia, protests and unrest in North Africa and in other Arab countries have not made any major waves. Russian leaders control the situation at home and do not fear any contagion. In fact, their main concern is not domestic uprising but rather what advantages they can make from the situation, especially as oil prices rise.
When street protests broke out in Tunisia and Egypt back in January, Moscow limited itself to condemning the use of force whilst reiterating the principles of “non-interference” in the internal affairs of other countries.
At a meeting of the National Anti-Terrorism Committee on 22 February, President Dmitri Medvedev warned that radical forces could seize power in a country like Libya. Deputy Prime Minister Igor Sechin suggested that Western nations might even be behind the unrest. Two days later, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin also raised the spectre of radical Islam.
Moscow’s interest in the Jasmine Revolution rose marginally only when it came to Libya. On 24 February, Russia and the European Union adopted a joint statement condemning the use of force by Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi. Two days later, Russia backed sanctions imposed on Libya by the Security Council. However, Russia’s economic ties with North Africa and the Arab world are limited compared to other countries.
The biggest investments are in Libya, where Tatneft has already invested hundreds of millions of dollars in managing oil deposits (estimated at some 247 million tonnes), and Gazprom, which is planning to exploit the Elephant deposits in cooperation with the Italian company ENI.
Other major investments include a contract signed by Russian Railways to build a railway line in Libya, at a cost of US$ 2.2 billion, little compared to the tens of billions of Sino-Libyan trade.
This, Marcin Kaczmarski writes in the Eastweek journal, explains why Moscow is standing on the sidelines, waiting to get as much out of the situation as possible.
Russia’s involvement in the strife-affected nations is limited. Moscow can thus wait to choose sides when it will be clear who the winners will be, whether liberal democrats or radical Islamists. By contrast, powers that have entertained extensive links with existing regimes are in a more difficult position. Only three months ago during a visit to Bahrain, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said that the situation was quiet and without problems.
Libya produces 2 per cent of the world oil output, mostly for Europe. The Suez Canal is crucial for European supplies (through the canal and a pipeline). Lower supplies and greater uncertainties are driving prices upward, to the advantage of oil-producing Russia. At the beginning of March, the price of Urals oil stood at around US$ 109, far higher than the US$ 75 projected for mid-year.
If Europe loses access to North African supplies, it would have to turn to Russia, which would strengthen Moscow’s economic and political position vis-à-vis the Caucasus and central Europe.
Russia’s arms industry might suffer though. The Kremlin is one of the world’s major weapon producers, and has been criticised for selling arms to certain regimes. For instance, recent sales to Libya came to about US billion, whilst contracts signed with Algeria stand at US$ 4 billion.
In the end, Moscow might have to stop deliveries to prevent the use of its weapons against civilians, but such a loss would be compensated by other advantages.
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