by Stefano Caprio

The majority of the population believe they have defeated the West, emboldened by the American u-turn. But now the question that circles their minds is ‘what happens next?’.

As happens every five or six years, the Easter holidays of 2025 coincide with the dates between Catholics and Orthodox, and during these days everyone begins the rites of Holy Lent, with the mutual request for forgiveness while global negotiations are underway to find peace and put an end to conflicts, starting with the one between Russia and Ukraine that has shifted the world balance.

On Sunday 2nd March, the Patriarch of Moscow, Kirill (Gundjaev), presided over the Syropustnaja liturgy, of the ‘renunciation of cheese’ which follows the previous Mjasopustnaja week, the ‘renunciation of meat’ which in the Latin world has produced Carnival - the wild celebration of ‘goodbye to meat’ - while in Orthodox practice, all food of animal origin is renounced until Easter, and forgiveness is requested before beginning the Velikij Post, the ‘Great Fast’.

As the patriarch explained to the faithful, the post is a ‘special period, which requires much more from man than usual in terms of attention to his spiritual life, thoroughly analysing his thoughts, his words, and of course his actions’.

Lenten fasting is ‘a school in which we finally turn to ourselves the attention that we normally lack, engulfed by our many daily concerns’, attention to be focused in particular on what happens in life, especially on the “conflicts that arise from emotions, rather than logic”, in which everyone feels offended, but “we are all to blame”, hinting in some way at the need to overcome mutual grievances even in war.

As Kirill explains, ‘when you enter a conflict situation, you have to do everything you can to resolve it’, and if you can't find a solution, at least ‘in the most acute phases of the conflict you have to ask yourself the question: what role have I played in all this?’ to avoid things ending in the worst possible way.

The patriarch did not explicitly mention the war in Ukraine, but in light of the ‘role swapping’ caused by the fluctuating negotiations, his exhortation seems to be addressed to both Russians and Ukrainians, Americans and Europeans, reaching a possible reconciliation ‘to avoid the worst’.

The Russians have always been convinced that they are in the right, and that victory would demonstrate the sacred nature of their mission to save the world from depravity.

The point is that when it seems that finally, in the Year of the Great Victory, this ‘mission’ is about to triumphantly conclude, an unexpected feeling of bewilderment is spreading in Russia, of a loss of understanding of ‘one's role’ and of the consequences of three years of madness and tragedies, in the uncertainty of the future that is taking shape.

There is a ‘sense of victory’, but it is not clear what it consists of, as various opinion polls among the Russian population, such as those of the Levada centre, attest.

The percentages of support for Tsar Putin are compared, which today reach a record level of 88%, as was the case in 2008 for the victory against Georgia, and in 2014 with the annexation of Crimea, but today there is no obvious object, except the certainty of having definitively conquered the Donbass territories, which, moreover, were largely under Russian control well before the start of the invasion of Ukraine.

In general, the majority of the population feels that they have defeated the entire West, comforted by the American about-face, which with Donald Trump's proclamations seems to have bowed to the principles pursued and spread by Russia's propaganda and ‘special operations’, in what is now defined as Trump-Putinism.

The question that arises, however, is ‘what happens now?’. If for the Ukrainians the problem is to be able to find agreements for the reconstruction of the destroyed country, and for the guarantees of security with respect to the possible reopening of the conflict, the Russians do not know exactly what to do with the victory, as much desired while fighting as meaningless once obtained.

The Levada tried to investigate further with the ‘Laboratory of the future’ of Novaya Gazeta, asking five questions to the interviewees, three on everyday life (price increases, buying foreign goods, the possibility of travelling abroad freely) and two on politics, regarding freedom of expression and the role of the police in Russian society, asking which of these indicators is destined to increase or decrease.

The spontaneous response to the questions, inspired by triumphalist euphoria, is not very Lenten: ‘everything will grow!’, both prices and repressions, but also freedom of speech, in an evident emotional confusion of public opinion.

The greatest uncertainty, on closer analysis, concerns the ‘growth of freedom’, a condition that Russians find difficult to understand, and to which 30% of those interviewed did not feel able to give an answer (40% of those with higher education), while for everything else the uncertain stand at 20-25%.

What the Russians trust most of all is the possibility of travelling abroad again, to Western countries and especially to America, a goal that they no longer intend to give up, especially the younger ones, who don't see great prospects of ‘turning to the East’ for their life experiences.

Equally widespread is the expectation of commercial products from abroad, comforted by news of the imminent reopening of Starbucks, given the Russian inability to produce a drinkable coffee, even if the dream remains the Russian rebirth of McDonald's, because we really can't take any more of the mouldy chips from Vkusno – i Točka!, the ’ Good – and that's it!’ with the inedible flavour of low-quality hamburgers (and here we're not even talking about Lent).

Among young people and students there is a widespread belief that as soon as the Svo, the ‘special military operation’, ends, a happy life of travel and unbridled shopping will begin, without the terror of mobilisation to the front, with the need to hide or escape who knows where.

The reopening of the borders is actually awaited by at least three quarters of Russians, not only by the youngest, just as the vast majority dream of the reopening of the markets, putting an end to the regime of isolation and autarchy against which nobody dares to protest openly, but which has evidently reached the end of its tether.

The main contradiction in the Russian soul concerns the simultaneous growth of freedom and repression, as well as the fact that the great abundance of products will inevitably be accompanied by a sharp increase in prices and the cost of living.

The poorest groups are the ones most likely to predict these increases, while the wealthy are not too worried. This is influenced by the disruptive effect of the increase in inflation, which for over a year has been causing a crisis in the entire Russian economy, without the Central Bank and other institutions being able to find an effective remedy.

However, for many people inflation means not only increased prices, but also increased earnings, if not exactly higher salaries, so it doesn't necessarily prevent an increase in well-being, at least in the higher social classes.

In short, prices will be what they will be, but the desire to spend money for one's own satisfaction prevails, and to put an end to sending gifts to the soldiers at the front in Ukraine. Most of the young people responding to the survey assure us that ‘we will go wherever we want, and buy everything we like’.

The Russians didn't really like the long anti-Western fast, and dream of once again parading through the streets of Paris like the hussars of Alexander I on 31st March 1814 after their victory over Napoleon, which not by chance was evoked by Vladimir Putin when addressing Emmanuel Macron, in the face of Europe's rearmament announcements.

Surveys also show that the desire for freedom in Russia will be accompanied by increasingly widespread and intense actions by the police. But it's not a question of fear of repression, which is a condition that Russians are used to, not only because of the persecutions of recent years, but also because of an ancestral allergy to dissent.

The first Russian political police force was created by Ivan the Terrible in 1560 with the Opričniki guard, and even cultural associations are dedicated to them today. Most Russians candidly state that ‘those loyal to the government are truly free’.

What many Russians fear is the return of the ‘hussars’ to their own country, rather than their ride to Paris. More and more squares, schools and museums are dedicated to the ‘Heroes of the Svo’ who fell in Ukraine, and there are now dozens of deputies, mayors and governors chosen from among the returning fighters, who regularly give ‘Foundations of Security’ and military training lessons in schools, starting with kindergarten children.

Considering that thousands of soldiers have been recruited directly from among criminals (including rapists and paedophiles), there is no doubt that many more policemen are needed on the streets.

To protect the renewed well-being of the winners, who are just waiting for the Easter of their own resurrection, even before that of the Redeemer hanging on the Cross.

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