by Alessandra De Poli

With the end of the Assad regime, there are questions about the possibility of a change of government even in Tehran, which appears increasingly weakened. As Prof. Pejman Abdolmohammadi, professor of Middle East international relations at Trent University, in the new U.S. view of the region, the Houthis and the Shiite militias in Iraq are the next elements of the so-called Iranian "Axis of Resistance" that could be affected

After the upheavals that led to the fall of the Assad regime in Syria, many have begun to wonder if a fall of the Islamic Republic regime in Iran, which from recent events in the Middle East appears to be the weakest actor of all, will also be possible.

The next to be hit will be the Houthis and the Hashd al-Sha'abi militias in Iraq, the other pro-Iranian forces operating in the Middle East, however, then get to Tehran, which is the leader of these forces, argues Professor Pejman Abdolmohammadi, professor of Middle East international relations at the University of Trento and researcher at ISPI (Institute for International Policy Studies):

"So far three Hs have fallen: Hamas, Hezbollah and the pro-Shiite militias in Syria known as Haramyun. Two are missing in order to further weaken the Islamic Republic of Iran: the Houthis in Yemen and the Hashd al-Sha'abi," the Popular Mobilization Forces, which encapsulate within them a number of predominantly Shiite militias.

What is happening in the Middle East is, according to the professor, the realization of a paradigm shift that began with Donald Trump's first presidency: "A political, economic and even intelligence trend against radical and moderate political Islam begins at that time.

Since the 1970s, both Republicans and Democrats believed that the presence of leadership linked to political Islam could somehow foster a possible increase in influence vis-à-vis the Middle East. Although the doctrines of George H. W. Bush and Barack Obama were different, they moved within the same paradigm."

The arrival of Donald Trump, however, is a game changer: "There comes a vision of a different America, one that wants a different system in the Middle East as well, and one that has other global interests, first and foremost countering and very firmly containing China, something that the 'old' paradigm did not want instead, in fact, it often sought cooperation with Beijing," the professor continues.

The starting point of this new trend lies in the withdrawal by the United States from the Iran nuclear deal, which had been signed in 2015 between Iran and the five countries of the UN Permanent Council (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States) plus Germany.

And that then continues with the targeted killings in recent years: from that in 2020 of Iranian General Qassem Soleimani, the main architect of what Iran calls the "Axis of Resistance," composed of Iranian proxies in the Middle East, to that of Isma'il Haniyeh, which took place in Tehran and which, along with the explosion of Hezbollah members' pagers, made the Islamic Republic's fragility clear to the world. In this case, these were actions perpetrated by Israel, which continued to advance the goals of the new U.S. paradigm desired by Trump in the Middle East.

"With the arrival of the covid and the Biden presidency there has been a slowdown," Abdolmohammadi points out, and in some cases a return to the classical relationship model (see "as a concrete example," the expert comments, "the unfreezing of six billion dollars of funds to Iran" in 2023). But it is this new trend that has led to the weakening of Iran that we see today.

And now, after the fall of the Assad-allied regime in Syria, Tehran "will do everything it can to seek the resilience of the regime, whose first concern, like all regimes, is its own survival," the international relations professor continues.

It is in this sense that Iran's most recent statements should be read, for example, it held talks in Geneva last week with some European countries to return to a nuclear deal. Commenting on events in Syria, the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic, Ali Khamenei, refusing to acknowledge a failure of the so-called "Axis of Resistance," said that "the territories that have been seized in Syria will be liberated by the brave Syrian youth. Have no doubt that this will happen."

It should not be forgotten that Iran's growing weakness in the international arena has been accompanied by growing popular uprisings domestically. "So far, the Islamic Republic, being a rational actor, has always managed to negotiate and mediate society's growing dissent against it," Abdolmohammadi says.

It has also done so by "projecting domestically the power built between 2003 and 2017 by pro-Iranian militias in the Middle East. But after Suleimani's assassination, another big blow came for the Islamic Republic: the 'woman, life, freedom' protests. The new Iranians," the lecturer comments, "took to the streets for a whole year and fought for freedom, not for a new Islamic nation, because Iranian society today is actually strongly secular, at least 80 percent. The cultural revolution has already taken place."

"If the project has not been completed so far, it is because," the researcher goes on to explain, "the protests were forcibly suppressed, no global actor supported the Iranian youth, and finally Hamas, in a crazy action, carried out the October 7 attacks. It was at that moment that Israel rejected the old paradigm and decided to decapitate the Iranian proxy leadership."

And in the meantime, a (somewhat paradoxical) "unity of purpose was created between the Israeli government, most of Iranian society and a part of the Sunni Arab world. While the only power that would like to save the Islamic Republic is China along with a part of the U.S. and European democrats (the world close to Borell and Mogherini)," Abdolmohammadi continues.

Yet many believe that Beijing, partly by tradition, partly by culture, has no interest in intervening in the affairs of other countries. "It is an assumption, but I believe that a democratic and stable Iran is not convenient for China, which instead prefers a chaotic Middle East to sell products that would not find outlets elsewhere and buy cheap energy. Just think of the fact that 90 percent of Iranian oil is sold to Beijing."

Unless new variables crop up, if this new paradigm continues, it is therefore likely to come full circle with the fall of the regime in Iran. "That is the intention," comments Professor Abdolmohammadi.

"There cannot be a new Middle East without a new Iran that can be secular-democratic. Although a free Iran would be a thorn in the side for the whole region, so we can expect forces to counter this vision. Iran, with Shiite-style political Islam, has fostered within the new paradigm the political Islamization of Middle Eastern societies. At the same time today, Iran has the potential to convert into its opposite."