From Gaza to Tehran, the Saudi (diplomatic) game for Gulf supremacy

Saudi Arabia is at the crossroads of several global issues, from the war in Ukraine to the future of the Gaza Strip and Iranian nuclear power. Under the leadership of bin Salman, the kingdom has strengthened relations with Trump and defused tensions with Tehran. The game of normalisation with Israel and the internal challenge with the United Arab Emirates for hegemony in the Gulf.

Milan (AsiaNews) - From Israel's war against Hamas in Gaza to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, to the Iranian nuclear game, there are many open dossiers on the international political agenda, with one thing in common: the paths of mediation and the protagonists of these games all seem to converge towards Riyadh - where talks between Moscow and Washington have begun today - which is establishing itself as a crossroads for the future organisation of regional and global politics and alliances. Analysts emphasise the ‘primary role’ of the Wahhabi kingdom and its leader Mohammed bin Salman (Mbs), who for some time now seems to have transformed himself from ‘prince of war’ to a man of ‘stability’, more interested in the economy and mediation than in the clash of arms.

Riyadh and the ‘Iranian file’

An attack by Hamas on Israel; the Russian war in Ukraine; the fall of the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria and the weakening of Hezbollah in Lebanon; a rapprochement between the Saudis and Iranians (mediated by China); a renewed alliance between Ankara and Qatar, with Doha hosting the summits of the militant group that controls Gaza and strengthening the bond with Tehran, which is operating behind the scenes in Yemen with the Houthi - and in the seas, starting with the Strait of Hormuz - in an attempt to maintain its role in the region. A new global order is emerging, while the economic blocs linked to Russia and China are looking for new ways to expand and countries such as Iran and Saudi Arabia - leaders of the Shia and Sunni Muslim world respectively - are repositioning themselves in a framework of uncertain balances.

According to CNN sources, in recent weeks the Saudi kingdom has proposed to act as a ‘mediator’ between the United States and Iran, starting with the nuclear dossier on which it would like to reach a ‘new agreement’ in an attempt to freeze the ayatollahs' atomic programme. ‘The kingdom is concerned,’ writes the US news network, ’that Iran may be more inclined to pursue a nuclear weapon now that its regional proxies, long seen as a deterrent against Israeli attacks, have been significantly weakened.’ Riyadh would like to exploit its contacts with President Donald Trump – already during his first term relations had strengthened after the freeze with Barack Obama and despite the controversy linked to the murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi in 2018 – to provide Tehran with a diplomatic bridge.

In this regard, it is not clear whether Saudi Arabia has made a ‘formal offer’, but Riyadh's desire to play a leading role in the game is evident, also counting on improving relations with its former enemy. Furthermore, by securing a place at the negotiating table for a potential new nuclear agreement with Trump, who alternates the threat of weapons with the diplomatic card, and on the other hand, with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who last week branded talks with Washington as ‘not smart’. In 2015 Riyadh had ‘officially’ welcomed the Iranian nuclear agreement (JCPOA, wanted by Obama), protesting in private at the lack of attention paid by the then occupant of the White House to Saudi concerns, from Yemen to Lebanon. Hence the support for Trump in the withdrawal from the nuclear pact which, in fact, had led to an escalation of Houthi attacks from Yemen into Saudi territory, in particular towards the oil wells.

From Gaza to ‘Abraham II’

Since then, however, tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran have eased considerably and Riyadh's low profile on Gaza has also proved decisive in a mediating role. In March 2023, the two countries surprisingly announced the normalisation of relations, with an agreement brokered by China that Riyadh hailed as a success and reaped the rewards in the following phase: Houthi missile launches ceased and the kingdom was spared from last year's cross-strikes between Israel and Tehran, despite fears for the oil installations in the Gulf. This is why the Saudi leadership sees the current regional landscape as a historic opportunity: on the one hand to strengthen ties with the Islamic Republic, while keeping the door open to a ‘normalisation’ with Israel along the lines of the ‘Abraham Accords’ between the Jewish state and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) during Trump's first term as president.

Furthermore, an excessive weakening of Tehran would not be functional to Saudi interests, which have recalibrated their foreign policy giving priority to economic interests that would end up being damaged by further instability. Firas Maksad, senior fellow at the Middle East Institute in Washington, emphasises the principles of ‘flexibility and pragmatism’ promoted by Riyadh: ‘Signalling a willingness to mediate between the US and Iran allows the kingdom to tacitly distance itself from Trump's maximum pressure campaign against Tehran’. Further stirring the waters is the White House plan for Gaza, with the Americans - backed by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu - wanting to ‘take control’ of the Strip and expel the Palestinian population. A proposal already rejected by the Saudis, who insist on the two-state solution for Israel and Palestine. The bond between the White House and the Saudi leadership remains strong, so much so that Trump himself has hinted that Riyadh could be the destination of his first trip abroad as president, where he will meet a bin Salman ‘wiser and more mature’ than in 2017.

The challenge with the Emirates

Another major player in the region, the United Arab Emirates – allies and rivals of Riyadh – has a position in the game for the future of Gaza, playing a leading role in the normalisation of relations with Israel during Trump I, and today seem to suffer from Saudi hegemony. In an attempt to strengthen the alliance with the White House (after Israel and Riyadh, they are the last stop on the Middle East tour of the US Secretary of State, Marco Rubio), the Emirati ambassador to Washington, Yousef al-Otaiba, said he saw no ‘alternative’ to Trump's plan to evict the Palestinians. On the sidelines of the World Government Summit in Dubai he described the US approach as ‘difficult’ but, although many are looking for solutions, ‘we don't know where it will end’. ‘I don't see an alternative - he emphasised - to what is being proposed’ and even Abu Dhabi has no different ideas.

These words reflect, perhaps unconsciously, the UAE's loss of leadership after decades of regional supremacy, now matched - if not surpassed - by the Saudis in economic and diplomatic terms under the impetus of the ‘Vision 2030’. According to the World Investment Report 2024 of the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the value of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in the Emirates amounted to 30.688 billion dollars in 2023, compared to 22.737 billion dollars in 2022. The increase recorded by Riyadh is impressive, exceeding the planned target of 16% to reach 25.6 billion dollars in 2023, with inflows 50% higher than in 2022. The Saudis intend to increase the share of trade and investment and are in a strong position to attract talent and companies. However, while many foreign multinationals - including Apple, Google, Microsoft, Siemens and Persico - have opened new offices in Saudi Arabia, others have opted for two separate offices in Riyadh and Abu Dhabi or Dubai.

One of the consequences of the struggle between the Saudis and the Emirates is the potential internal turmoil within the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the most important organisation within the Arab world, already marked in recent years by the boycott - later withdrawn - of Qatar. The competition between the two countries, combined with the personal opposition between Mbs and Mbz (the president of the Emirates, Mohammed bin Zayed), has exacerbated tensions. The struggle complicates the organisation's ability to adopt unified policies on regional issues and crises, potentially reducing its relevance. However, analysts and experts believe that, although moving at different speeds, GCC states have made joint efforts towards sub-regional integration, including infrastructures such as roads, railways and ports. Most of the upheavals in the past have been related to political rather than economic issues, and cooperation rather than confrontation will remain the preferred option to avoid serious instability.

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