Beijing, Moscow and the Ukraine negotiations

Rumours of a possible deployment of Chinese troops in Ukraine - denied (for now) by the Beijing Foreign Ministry - have been received with nervousness by the Russians. In a conflict perceived as distant, Xi Jimping looks to safeguard his own interests, much more than to the obsessive opposition of ‘eternal ally’ Putin.

Moscow (AsiaNews) - Rumours of possible support from Beijing to the coalition of ‘willing countries’ to form a peacekeeping force in Ukraine as a solution to the peace negotiations - denied, at least for now, by the spokesperson for the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs - are provoking very resentful reactions in Russia, as if China were ready to betray the ‘eternal’ alliance repeatedly reaffirmed in the meetings between Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping.

Moreover, Donald Trump's surprising proposals in this phase of talks at the highest levels seem to outline a marginalisation of the role of the Chinese in the geopolitical balance, which certainly appears to be a direct aim on the part of the Americans, but could also be an undeclared intention on the part of the Russians, who don't want to remain subjects of the Celestial Empire.

In recent years, Western countries have accused China of helping Russia in its military actions, not supporting sanctions and continuing to supply Moscow with electronic materials and other ‘dual-use’ items.

The Ukrainians in particular believe that Beijing is Moscow's main sponsor, and could easily have ordered it to stop the war, given its position as the ‘major partner’ of a Russia that is much weaker economically; the Chinese, on the other hand, have taken advantage of the conflict to grab many deals in Siberia and many other Russian regions, as well as opportunities in Central Asia.

However, things are not easy to decipher in such a vast area, as the Russian sinologist Aleksandr Gabuev, director of the Carnegie Centre in Berlin for the study of Russia and Eurasia, described in Russia as a ‘foreign agent’ working for an ‘undesirable organisation’.

He says that for Beijing it is important to re-establish peace in Ukraine, and it is not so important where the dividing line between the contenders is: ‘the Chinese are aware that they are not the centre of the world, and that they cannot force everyone to live according to their principles, but on the other hand they know that they are one of the main powers on the planet, at least on a par with America on the other side of the globe’.

In Asia, China has a position of total hegemony; in fact, everyone submits to the authority of Beijing and supports its main interests. According to this vision, ‘in an ideal world, harmony reigns, thanks to the strength and stability of China’.

Gabuev observes that between Eastern and Western cultures there is a clear distinction in the understanding of a ‘negotiation that is convenient for everyone’.

According to the Western win-win model, the balance between the parties must be 50 to 50, or at most 60 to 40, while according to the Chinese mentality it is not a question of proportions, but of positive results obtained by both parties, no matter to what extent: ‘if we do a deal and you earn 99, and I earn only one cent, I still have something to show for it’.

Regarding the current war, the Chinese don't understand Putin's “obsessive mania” of wanting to take everything, without being satisfied with the lot he has already secured.

In any case, the conflict between Russia and Ukraine is a matter very far from China's interests, unlike Europe and even America. It is important only insofar as it involves a significant partner such as Russia, a ‘little sister’ for some time now for China, with a similar political culture and a strategic orientation in opposition to the dominant aims of the United States, in the vision of a ‘multipolar world’.

On the other hand, Europe is involved in the conflict, as it is the main market for Chinese products, and is important from a technological point of view, for investments and much more. Ukraine itself has a not inconsiderable significance for China, even if not at the level of the great powers.

The war for China, the sinologist confirms, concerns ‘production, energy systems, fertilisers and metals’. What really counts is the price of the most important items, and the war in Ukraine has a very negative effect on all this.

This is why China wants peace, leaving Russia extremely isolated from the West and as dependent as possible on Beijing, the country most ‘willing’ to defend its interests.