by Dariush Mirzai

Iran’s opposition is bringing together all those who have become disillusioned with the country’s failed reforms. Demonstrators are perhaps just being used in a war over the country’s economy.

Tehran (AsiaNews) – What is Iran’s future, and that of the opposition which has heroically challenged the establishment in recent weeks?

Ten years ago student unrest was brutally crushed. Today the repressive arm of the state has reached out again but has found a more diversified opposition armed with internet, cellphones and twitter.   Even the regime’s traditional use of Islamic-nationalist themes has not found many scapegoats to use. US President Barack Obama is not an easy adversary to criticise or blame.

What is certain is that Iranians have become more disillusioned. They have seen a reform-minded mullah like Khatami fail to reform the regime. They have seen that under Ahmadinejad the Islamic Republic has not been able to reduce corruption or offer more social justice. They have seen instead the regime reinforce its repressive apparatus to keep the system afloat, co-opting those it could not crush, something which it cannot however do forever at the elite level.

As the richest man in Iran Rafsanjani is openly opposed not only to Ahmadinejad but also to Khamenei and the Pasdarans, the regime’s powerful armed revolutionary militia. In this context Mousavi is just a front man like Ahmadinejad. Perhaps the Mullah Republic no longer belongs to the Shia clergy.

The Great Marjas, a small number of ayatollahs, stand at the helm of the Shia clerical hierarchy. Because of their knowledge, scholarship and lives above reproach they are sources to follow or imitate.

But Khamenei is not one of them. When he replaced Khomeini, he was but a hojjatoleslam, not a full ayatollah.

After he was elected to the presidency, Ahmadinejad did not choose a great marja as his spiritual advisor but opted instead for an outsider, a hard-line ayatollah, Mesbah Yazdi.

Khamenei and Ahmadinejad are closely linked to the Revolutionary Guards, the Pasdarans, and their vigilante units, the Basij. The white checkered scarf the supreme leader wears on top of his cassock is the Basij emblem. The Revolutionary Guards hold most power. The time when even a weak Khatami could order the Basij to stay in their barracks seems long gone.

If the Pasdarans are behind Ahmadinejad and Khamenei, Rafsanjani is behind Mousavi and the pro-democracy opposition. The powerful politician and businessman in a mullah outfit has come to realise the importance of the support of all those who have become disillusioned during the Ahmadinejad era.

In 2005 Rafsanjani’s unpopularity handed Ahmadinejad his electoral victory. Today as four years ago, Ahmadinejad is a threat to those who are “corrupt”, a group which Rafsanjani has come to symbolise, but he has failed so far to do anything about them.

Instead Rafsanjani has been able to consolidate his hold on certain institutions of the Iranian state like the Assembly of Experts, which has the power to remove Khamenei from office.

Rumour has it that Rafsanjani is currently in Qom to talk with other mullahs about possible scenarios concerning the current supreme leader. Is it a bluff or a just rumour? Whatever the case may be, it is at least a sign that the regime is divided.

Its brutal crackdown and its attempt to muzzle the media at all cost and the fear its rulers have felt at the popular unrest have left their mark.

Conversely, the opposition has been restrained, able to use the regime’s own symbols. Instead of demanding Western-styled freedoms, protesters have chanted “Allah Akbar!”, wearing green or black, Islamic colours par excellence.

In all this Obama and other Western governments have played it cool and not backed protesters too openly to avoid giving Khamenei a chance to play the nationalist card. Rafsanjani has also learnt the lesson, choosing instead to keep in the background. 

The courage and intelligence of the opposition is a source of hope for many Iranians in exile. This grassroots movement, backed and perhaps used by Rafsanjani, might in the end turn into a political force.

But in a country where the Pasdarans are in charge of border controls and have their own ports, where they have important economic interests to protect and can decide on their own the country’s nuclear programme, all backed by their own independent land, sea and air force, can the Islamic Republic be reformed?

• iran
• power
• struggle
• rafasanjani
• mouavi
• khamenei
• khomenei
• revolutionary
• guards
• pasdarans