The three crises behind Iran’s unrest
For Riccardo Redaelli, director of the Master in Middle Eastern Studies (MIMES) at the Graduate School of Economics and International Relations of the Catholic University of the Sacred Heart (Milan), protests by young Iranians are the result of the country’s gradual economic, social, and political decline. Within the regime, some are aware that concessions need to be made to avoid a bloodbath, while protesters have no alternative model should the regime fall.
Milan (AsiaNews) – “The protests and unrest that we are seeing in Iran are not a new revolution, but the result of three crises: economic, social and political,” this according to Riccardo Redaelli, professor of geopolitics and history of the Middle East and director of the Master in Middle Eastern Studies (MIMES) at the Graduate School of Economics and International Relations of the Catholic University of the Sacred Heart in Milan.
"The middle class, which played a fundamental role in Khomeini’s revolution and the end of Reza Shah’s monarchy in 1979, has become very poor,” Prof Redaelli notes. “Now young people are tired of the intrusive role of Iran’s theocracy in everyday life. Yet, the internal opposition to the system, which until the last elections was somehow present, has been marginalised.”
This has led to the street protests that broke out in mid-September after Mahsa Amini, a 22-year-old Kurdish woman, was beaten to death after she was detained by the morality police because she did not cover her head properly.
The theocratic regime responded to the protests with imprisonments and summary executions of young protesters accused of moharebeh, "enmity to God". Yet, while the conflict could escalate, the problem is that the opposition does not have an alternative model to the theocratic regime of the Islamic Republic.
Several times, experts and commentators have emphasised the uniqueness of these events as different social and ethnic groups (Persians, Kurds, Balochis, Tajiks, Azeris, etc.) appear to be coming together. Still, as much as bazaaris (merchants) are backing young people with strikes, it is hard to measure how widespread that support is.
Differences notwithstanding, the middle class "is already facing huge difficulties and does not want to end up like in Iraq and Syria", that is, failed states where local militias are in charge, even in economic matters.
For them, giving full support to the protests would mean "taking a leap into the unknown,” Redaelli explains. “We are talking about a middle class that traditionally does not take risks. While young people can't take it anymore, they don't have a viable alternative to propose in the event of the fall of the regime."
The most important fact is that many "young Iranians are openly turning against Islam. A growing number of them are either secretly converting to Zoroastrianism or wearing its symbol. Iran's politicised clergy have provoked this backlash against Islam in a country where religion has always been fundamental."
The system of government of the Islamic Republic set up after the overthrow of the monarchy in 1979 is dualistic: the president and the parliament are elected by the people but are supervised by the supreme leader and the Council of Guardians, made up of clerics and Shia Muslim jurists who can disqualify candidates in elections to protect Iran’s Islamic character.
This balance between political and clerical power has held for years because the president has often been a moderate. "Until 2019, some leaders sought to reform the system (called nizam), not destroy it. But reformists and moderates have been sidelined after the latest attempts at liberalisation.
“This has made the system more unified, but it has also made it much more vulnerable. These protests are more radical than previous ones because not only do they stem from different demands, but also because they do not have a leader.” As a result, protesters and defenders of the regime have come to direct blows.
“But there are divisions within the political leadership itself. Many do not like this drift towards extremism. Although the regime's media is calling for total repression, some politicians are aware of the impossibility of a bloodbath and there is deep disagreement, especially at the religious level.
“And so, there have been signs of openness,” such as the announcement of changes to the morality police. But for Iranians, they are not enough; on the contrary, they are only a symptom of division.
For Prof Redaelli, the Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, is at a crossroads. "He has never been able to make cultural concessions, whether on the head cover, hatred for Israel or overtures to the West, because he fears that everything could collapse; remove these symbols and the Islamic Republic would cease to exist since none of the objectives promised in 1979 has been achieved.”
“On the other hand, he too does not want a bloodbath because he does not want to be remembered like the shah,” the last monarch. In fact, the repression could have been even more brutal.
“So far, the pasdaran[*] have been held back and not been fully deployed”. During the unrest in 2019, there were three times the number of deaths reported so far this year (about 500 dead and more than 18,000 arrested). But three years ago, repression focused on ethnic minorities and people protesting the high cost of living.
“Today, Iranian soldiers instead are shooting at children as young as 13 or 14. This means they firmly believe that it is necessary to defend the regime." By contrast, in 1979, conscripts turned against the Pahlavis, which is why this cannot be called a revolution, at least not yet.
Still, "The regime is setting the stage for its long-term demise, because there can be no future in a country that kills its new generations. At the same time, what Iranian politicians are asking is: ‘What concessions can we make without decreeing the end of the Islamic Republic?’”
So far, this question has remained unanswered.
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[*] Formally known as the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the Pasdaran (guards) play a key role in Iran’s political and economic life.
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