Al Sabaileh: Hezbollah's ‘Lebanese Front’ and Pezeshkian Iran

In AsiaNews, the Jordanian scholar underlines the degree of ‘autonomy’ with which Nasrallah moves, who has turned Lebanon into the ‘front line’ to protect Tehran's interests. The militias supported by the Islamic Republic in the various countries of the Middle East are useful in pursuing the strategy of chaos. Pezeshkian ‘dialogue’ face with the West to ease sanctions.

Milan (AsiaNews) - ‘Hassan Nasrallah has recalled that it is he who will respond to the attacks and not Iran, marking a certain autonomy’ and at the same time avoiding ‘dragging Iran into a confrontation with Israel, which would be one of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's objectives’. Hezbollah has turned Lebanon into the ‘front line of this confrontation’ to ‘protect and ward off the threat from Iran’.

This is what Jordanian professor and geopolitical analyst Amer Al Sabaileh, an expert on Middle Eastern issues, international security, and the politics of peace processes in crisis areas, points out to AsiaNews. The scholar, who was born in Amman and holds a degree in modern languages and literature, is a contributor to several international newspapers including The Jordan Times.

As an expert, Al Sabaileh has drawn up numerous strategic studies, delving into various areas of war and terrorism, from North Africa to the Middle East. He serves as director general of the geopolitical risk research institute ‘Triageduepuntozero’ and is president of the Centre for Security Studies - Council for counter terrorism studies, from whose observatory he analyses the different areas of tension in the region. In this context, he emphasises the role of the militias that Tehran has used, from Lebanon to Yemen, to fuel tension or pursue its own objectives, including the encirclement of Israel.

On the domestic front, he believes that the victory of the reformist presidential candidate will not lead to significant changes. Below is our interview with the Jordanian scholar and expert:

Prof. Al Sabaileh what assessments can be made of the new government in Iran? In spite of the election victory of a ‘reformist’ president, does power still remain in the hands of the radical wing in key roles?
One would think that an Iran with a ‘reformist’ face would bring about change, and a rapprochement towards the West. This has been the case for the past 20 years, from [Seyyed Mohammad] Khātami to [Hassan] Rouhani, and the same applies to this latest election that brought Masoud Pezeshkian to the presidency. However, many doubts are emerging as to whether he will actually be able to bring about serious changes in Iranian politics. Rather, we seem to be in a ‘tactical’ phase used by Iran to move from one stage to another: for example, now the pressure on Tehran is very high, Israel seeks confrontation with Iran at all costs. This is why one cannot speak of change, all the more so if one analyses the presidency of the predecessor Ebrahim Raisi with whom the country was heading towards progressive radicalisation. No serious change is plausible, the impression is that he is trying to return to the previous - interrupted - phase of negotiations with the West under Rohuani, to loosen the bite of sanctions. But one cannot read this change without linking it to regional developments, the confrontation with Israel and the change in American policy towards Iran, starting with the nuclear issue. Tehran is forced into this tactical gesture, so as not to give Israel the chance to make Iran a constant threat to the West, and responsible for a possible confrontation on a global scale.

There are some figures within the government with a different proflio than in the recent past, for example Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, already an authoritative figure in the nuclear negotiations. What roles can they play?
A change should also come through the team accompanying the president, giving the impression that reformists have leading roles in the government. In reality, a key reformist figure such as [Mohammad Javad ] Zarif, who was the real architect of the nuclear agreements, only stayed for a few days [and then resigned ed.] His revocation of his resignation today means that war with Israel is no longer an option on the table. The personalities being appointed today may give the impression of having a link to the reformist world, but in reality we must be very cautious and assess the real objectives of the leadership. Certainly the choice of the foreign minister is symbolic, because he was the head of the delegation for the nuclear negotiations, so the message seems to be that of a return to the terrain of confrontation, of openness to try to have less pressure or sanctions. But after the experiences of the past it is difficult to frame this as a real change. At the same time we have to assess the ability to contain Iran's aggressive policies in the region and the ability to tame the hawks' and Pasdaran's control, their influence in domestic and foreign policy. It remains an open scenario, although the past leaves us with little hope: it seems more like temporary tactics to avoid the risks of a regional development and the fears of a possible return of [Donald] Trump to the leadership of the United States. I believe the goal is to use the last months of Joe Biden's presidency to reach an agreement that limits the US ability to strike Iran in the next four years of a possible, future Republican administration with more aggressive policies towards Iran.

Domestically in Tehran, repression and the number of executions has reached record levels. Foreign policy is marked by the many regional tensions. Which areas will the new executive be able to mark changes?
The Iranian challenge today is very difficult because it is first of all called upon to get out of the rhetoric of symbolism. Pezeshkian, when he was Minister of Health, made an important gesture by refusing to sign the medical reports of activists tortured to death. He was forced to resign over this. Reading it today as a signal on internal repression in Iran might be a good starting point, but his ability to turn the symbolic act into concrete steps I think is the real challenge. And unfortunately, assessing the situation over the last few years with Raisi and the growth of hawks in all key positions in the state, many doubts emerge about the ability to change.

What is Iran's current role in the Middle East chessboard? Is the war with Israel a real threat?
Certainly Iran is a major player in Middle East politics. It is the architect of chaos in the region. Tehran has always thought of expanding its presence through the role of militias, and this has worked very well in Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen, and is still working in Syria. Iran's concept is one of chaos building: after all, the war, the instability in this region is linked to the presence of all these militias. Those who sponsor and support them are the ‘architects of chaos’, and the strength of these militias in the various countries is essential for Iran's long-term goal of putting Israel under the ‘threat triangle’ that runs from Gaza to Lebanon to the West Bank. Hence the willingness to sponsor militias in the West Bank, transform Jordan into a place for smuggling drugs and weapons... Tehran always finds its space and its role in this framework of instability and this is also why we cannot consider the Iranian role marginal.

How much does the weakness of the international community weigh in the regional escalation? And what factor could be decisive in determining a return to the negotiating table?
The international community is weak, absent. For many years it has turned a blind eye by favouring the growth of these militias and the Iranian policies that fuelled their strength. Today it is faced with a critical situation, lacking the tools to deal with reality, indecisive and hesitant. This is particularly evident in Yemen, where the international community has gone against Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (Eau) in their war against the Houthis, preventing the last battle in Hodeidah in 2016 and applied sanctions against Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. What happened has to be reviewed by analysing the policies of former US President Barack Obama that in fact allowed the growth of militias in Yemen. Add to this the Iranian policy that, while wearing the mask of reformism by talking to the international community about the nuclear agreement, on the other hand supported General Qasem Soleimani as he pursued his role in rebuilding the militias, making them ever stronger. Today, after 7 October, Israel faces a reality in which it is fighting with these groups that represent, from an Iranian perspective, the concept of the last fight, the last battle against Israel. This is why today Israel itself feels the duty to individually confront the various fronts from north to south, to protect itself from a new threat. The international community observes the results of the growth in recent years of these militias with the arsenals of Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis capable of creating serious disruptions even to maritime navigation and international trade. This is why returning to the negotiating table seems an unavoidable necessity. But one also has to reckon with the presence of the militias, the weapons they benefit from, which pose a threat to stability at any time.

Will the new government in Tehran be able to change the balance of power and relations with Hezbollah?
It is difficult for Tehran to change its relationship with Hezbollah because it represents the stronghold of its presence in the Middle East. It is what is considered Iran's operational arm, in which it has invested for so many years and from which it cannot disconnect. Moreover, one has to consider that Hezbollah is not only an armed militia but also a political party represented in Parliament and thus part of the Lebanese social fabric. This means that Iran has succeeded in entering Lebanon as a permanent player and it is difficult for it to leave Hezbollah, which distances itself from it even though it can do no more than send weapons. However, it is also worth noting that in one of his last speeches, Hassan Nasrallah recalled that it is he who will respond to attacks and not Iran, marking a certain autonomy. And avoiding dragging Iran into a confrontation with Israel, which is one of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's objectives. Hezbollah has turned Lebanon into the ‘front line’ of this confrontation, to protect and ward off the threat from Iran.

From the Jordanian perspective, how do you look at the growing tensions in the Middle East and, above all, at what level are relations between Amman and Tehran?
Jordan fears that the escalation of this conflict could flare up into a regional war, with risks and consequences for everyone. Geographically, unfortunately, Jordan is in the middle and this was also made manifest last April when Iran decided to respond to Israel by violating Jordanian airspace. Amman, being part of the US Central Command, had to respond but realised early on that such a confrontation would end up having very serious consequences. In addition, there is the aggressive Iranian policy of attacking Jordan and basing militias in southern Syria to fuel the internal smuggling of drugs and weapons. That is why, now, the idea of the government in Amman is to zero in on the conflict and show no signs of hostility towards Tehran, while making it clear that its territory must be spared. All in all, I think the message was clear and has been picked up, all the more so today with the arrival of the reformists, making them understand that the country must be safeguarded. Even if its location does not help Jordan: there is a risk that the situation could degenerate. For its own security, Jordan is willing to do anything, even talk to Iran in order to avert the scenario of a regional war.